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Abstract
This Essay critiques the creation by the 114th Congress of a
federal private right of action under the Defend Trade Secrets Act
for the state unfair competition cause of trade secret
misappropriation hitherto applied mostly to breaches of express or
implied confidential relationships between businesses or with
employees. The proposed insertion of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act definition of “misappropriation,” including acquisition by
“improper means” exemplified by state commercial mores’
expectation of privacy from aerial reconnaissance, into the
Economic Espionage Act framework of theft of a more narrowly
defined “trade secret” of a defined “owner,” including such actions
abroad by American companies, opens litigation opportunities
that are unlikely to fulfill the purposes of the legislation. There is
no current need to “harmonize” compliance programs, and the
non-preemptive legislation would simply add more issues to be
litigated in multiple contexts, including disputes over privacy or
confidentiality managed by online terms.
The legislation’s
limitation of injunctions under a promise of “employee mobility”
threatens state practices of contractual restrictions on postemployment competition.
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I. Introduction
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (“DTSA”)1 would create
a federal private right of action under the Economic Espionage
Act (“EEA”)2 for the state unfair competition tort of
“misappropriation,” which is defined under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (“UTSA”) to include acquisition of competitively
valuable information by “improper means” or use in breach of a
contractual or other duty “to maintain its secrecy or limit its
use.”3
1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong.
(2015).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012).
3. The UTSA was promulgated in 1979 and revised in 1985 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Unif. Trade
Secrets
Act
(1985),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf. It
has been adopted in forty-seven states, Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets
Act,
UNIF.
L.
COMM’N
(2015),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2015) [hereinafter UTSA] (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review), and adopted in substance in North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
66-152–66-157 (2015).
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Over the nearly two centuries of using this branch of state
unfair competition law,4 the overwhelming portion of cases have
involved unauthorized use of information lawfully acquired in
broken business deals and by employees who leave and compete.5
The only paradigm for non-fraudulent, non-trespassory “improper
means” remains aerial reconnaissance as against “commercial
morality.”6 The current proliferation of aerial drones with
cameras may see challenges through UTSA or DTSA actions, if
not by self-help.
The DTSA’s sponsors justify their departure from tort reform
with the need to combat alleged theft of American trade secrets,
valued at twelve figures annually, including theft through foreign
cyber-espionage and theft of the embodiments of trade secrets
such as trespass to steal experimental seeds.7 This Essay
questions whether the DTSA’s contribution to solving these
problems8 is outweighed by clear societal costs9—including those
4. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 525 (1837) (regarding a restrictive
covenant on the secret art of making chocolate); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§§ 757–759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (addressing trade secrets); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (addressing
trade secrets).
5. See David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2010) (“[T]he alleged
misappropriator was an employee or a business partner 93% of the time in this
state study. That figure was comparable to that of the federal study, which
showed the alleged misappropriator to be an employee or a business partner in
90% of cases.”).
6. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1974) (citing E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)).
Aerial reconnaissance is also discussed as an example of possibly improper
means in the UTSA. UTSA, supra note 3, § 1 cmt.
7. See 161 CONG. REC. S7250–51 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (discussing the impact of trade secret theft).
8. Cyber-theft typically is perpetrated by depositing malware through
“spearphishing”—tricking insiders to open malware files through believable
emails (such as apparently from a trusted person). Other than apprehending the
sender (which DTSA does not provide for, but existing EEA does) the solutions
include insider discipline as to secure practices, malware detection, and
restriction of internal access, which are not subjects of DTSA. Other foreign
agent theft is already addressed by existing EEA and fits within diversity
federal diversity jurisdiction. “Stings” or “entrapment” of suspect insiders are
available under existing EEA, but not under UTSA or DTSA.
9. Proponents have identified a swing from patent disclosure to trade
secret non-disclosure (as was prevalent in the 1970s, see UTSA, supra note 3, at
Prefatory Note), because of the elimination of the “best mode” requirement for
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of American businesses—in establishment of a not-quite-parallelto-UTSA federal tort of unfair competition applied in practice
mostly to broken deals and exiting employees.
The DTSA may backfire by enabling—through its minimal
jurisdictional requirements10—and incentivizing11 suits by nonpracticing entities12 and foreign entities for breaches of foreign
duties.13 Even if it does not, by failing to preempt state trade
patents, the limitation of the effect of “secret use” on patentability, and the
expansion of prior use rights by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Such “siloing” of knowledge arguably led to the
downfall of the mini-computer giants of 1980s Massachusetts.
10. DTSA § 2 creates a new 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) cause for an “owner of a
trade secret,” defined at existing §§ 1839(3)–(4), “who is aggrieved by a [UTSA]
misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in,
or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” Defend Trade Secrets Act
of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015) (emphasis added). This
is considerably broader than the “theft of trade secrets” offense of EEA that
requires an “intent to convert . . . to the economic benefit of anyone other than
the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will injure any
owner of that trade secret” and knowing theft, transmission, receipt, attempt, or
conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012) (emphasis added). There is no jurisdictional
amount required, as in diversity jurisdiction, or by many state courts of general
jurisdiction. See H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2 (addressing federal jurisdiction for
theft of trade secrets).
11. Overlooking the UTSA § 3 Comment that the section authorizes double
exemplary damages in addition to actual recovery, DTSA on its face authorizes
triple exemplary damages. H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2(a) (providing for triple
damages under proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C)). DTSA allows the trade
secret plaintiff to wait five years to sue while the defendant develops a market
and collects revenues—two more years than UTSA § 6. See id. § 2(d) (providing
the period of limitations).
12. This is the broad definition of “troll” for a patent, ownership of which by
itself does not merit, since eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006),
an injunction against further infringement unless there is irreparable injury
threatened, for example, to the good will of an owner that practices the patented
invention. Under the UTSA, injunction against use of a “secret” may be enjoined
as irreparable “disclosure” (typically in violation of a non-disclosure agreement)
even if the plaintiff does not use the “secret.” Some proponents of the DTSA
dismiss application of the much narrower “troll” business model of “holding up”
multiple defendants because UTSA misappropriation is an intentional tort
unlike the strict liability infringement of patents, that is, trade secrets are not
“property” like patents (even weakened by eBay).
13. Existing 18 U.S.C. § 1837 expressly allows application of “the chapter”
to conduct occurring outside the United States if “the offender is a natural
person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States, or an
organization organized under the laws of the United States or a State or
political subdivision thereof . . . .” DTSA places in the chapter a private right of
action for UTSA misappropriation—including acquisition by “improper means”
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secret misappropriation law and setting up a not-quite-parallel
federal regime, DTSA exposes significant issues to be litigated in
both regimes. Such litigation not only increases the cost of
protecting trade secrets, but may narrow the adopted EEA “trade
secret” definition in ways not previously challenged by criminal
defense lawyers who represented individuals with limited
resources.
Litigation over these issues may affect the law of business
and employment relationships involved in most trade secret
cases, including concepts of express and implied consent,
contracts, and expectations of privacy. Indeed, the DTSA
sponsors expressly recorded in the legislative history its policy of
“employee mobility,” that the DTSA “states explicitly that a
person cannot be prevented from accepting an offer of
employment because of his or her prior exposure to trade
secrets.”14 As discussed below, if this language survives through
enactment, there is much to argue as to its effects, if any, on
employee non-compete agreements, a mainstay of nonCalifornian American business.
Many of these issues stem from the mismatch of the UTSA
codification of the unfair competition of use of information in
breach of a duty “to maintain its secrecy or limit its use” or
acquired by “improper means” with the more narrowly targeted
EEA criminal theft or conversion of a “trade secret.”
II. UTSA “Misappropriation” Is Unfair Competition in Use of
Open-Ended “Trade Secrets”
A wide range of conduct has been called “misappropriation,”
such as copying products or “free-riding” on another’s
achievements in the market. Misappropriation is also called
“unfair competition” by some aggrieved parties.
Congress has not granted a federal private right of action for
general unfair competition as, for example, addressed under the
viewed against commercial morality and duties attached to relationships to
maintain secrecy or limit use. See H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2 (defining
“misappropriation” and “improper means”).
14. 161 CONG. REC. S7252 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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Federal Trade Commission Act.15 It has acted under the
Commerce Clause to create (1) a federal private right of action
under the Lanham Act for unfair competition in misappropriation
of commercial identity—originally, and still primarily, of
federally registered trademarks16; and (2) a federal private right
of action under the Copyright Act for misappropriation of
unpublished works previously protected under state law.17
Unfair competition through trade secret misappropriation
involves many more legal issues than are raised by copying a
trademark that the public has associated with a source or an
unpublished manuscript. In the earliest American cases, “trade
secrets” were defined as the knowledge of someone who acquired
it lawfully in commerce, including employment, but who was
bound by some “confidential” relationship to limit its use and
disclosure.18 The wrong occurred in the breach of that duty of
confidentiality. If the duty was created by contract, the wrong
would be a breach of contract. If it was created by a recognized
fiduciary, confidential, or agency relationship, the wrong would
15. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). In contrast many states have “Baby FTC Acts”
that do grant such private rights of action, often used against trade secret
misappropriation. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 2 & 11 (West 2015).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–1129 (2012). DTSA proponents cite the coexistence of
the Lanham Act and state unfair competition (trademark) law to support the
creation of a dual system of civil trade secret misappropriation law. The analogy
is inapt because of the much greater interaction of the UTSA with different
bodies of state law as outlined in this Essay and the particularly open-ended
UTSA “trade secret.” The DTSA’s adaptation of the Lanham Act provision for
specified time and space civil seizure of counterfeits of federally registered
trademarks (and not merely unauthorized distribution), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d), is
hardly applicable to ideas in a person’s memory. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong., § 2(a) (2015) (providing requirements of
civil seizure).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (preempting state law). The Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, was a back-up argument for the change
from pre-1976 publish-with-notice-for-limited-monopoly as the quid pro quo
under the Patent and Copyright Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Some have
suggested the AIA’s cut-back on disclosure also challenges that quid pro quo.
18. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 461–62 (Mass. 1868) (regarding
confidential employment and “secrets of trade”); Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523,
525 (1837) (regarding trade secrets following the sale of a chocolate factory);
Peter Andreas, Piracy and Fraud Propelled the U.S. Industrial Revolution,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/201302-01/piracy-and-fraud-propelled-the-u-s-industrial-revolution (last visited Oct.
19, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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be a breach of that duty. What trade secret misappropriation law
added was recognition of non-contractual, non-fiduciary duties
arising in business negotiations and sales, which overlap fraudtype “improper means” of acquisition.19
In cataloguing its torts, the 1939 Restatement expressly
rejected a “property” theory of entitlement: “The suggestion that
one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret
because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently
advanced and rejected.”20
State causes of action for “misappropriation” by copying
publicly available product design were found to have been
preempted by federal patent law in the 1964 case Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co.21 In 1974, the Supreme Court in Kewanee v.
Bicron22 cleared from such preemption the following types of
trade secret “misappropriation”:
The protection accorded the trade secret holder is against the
disclosure or unauthorized use of the trade secret by those to
whom the secret has been confided under the express or
implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse. The law also
protects the holder of a trade secret against disclosure or use
when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner’s volition, but
by some “improper means,” Restatement of Torts § 757(a),
which may include theft, wiretapping, or even aerial
reconnaissance.23

The 1939 Restatement described “improper means of
discovery” as those that “fall below the generally accepted
standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.”24 The
19. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(addressing improper means and also acquisition by mistake). Section 758
restates rules for innocent acquisition. Section 759 restates a cause for
procurement by “improper means” of business information not rising to the level
of 1939 RESTATEMENT’s “trade secrets” as defined in comment b to section 757.
20. Id. § 757 cmt. a.
21. 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964) (“[T]he patent system is one in which
uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the
same time preserving free competition.”).
22. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
23. Id. at 475–76.
24. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(including as examples acquisition by physical force, “fraudulent
misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone wires,
eavesdropping or other espionage”); see also id. § 759 cmt. c
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Kewanee Court added the aerial reconnaissance example of E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,25 explaining: “The
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the
encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind
trade secret law. ‘The necessity of good faith and honest fair
dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial world.’”26 The
Christopher court reasoned:
The Supreme Court of [Texas] has declared that “the
undoubted tendency of the law has been to recognize and
enforce higher standards of commercial morality in the
business world.” . . . To obtain knowledge of a process without
spending the time and money to discover it independently is
improper unless the holder voluntarily discloses it or fails to
take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy. . . . Perhaps
ordinary fences and roofs must be built to shut out incursive
eyes, but we need not require the discoverer of a trade secret
to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the
unpreventable methods of espionage now available.27

State support of an expectation of respect of reasonable
precautions against information-gathering without fraud or
physical trespass may be considered recognition of commercial
privacy.28
The 1979 UTSA greatly expanded the 1939 Restatement’s
definition of a “trade secret,” which was defined as “a process or
Among the means which are improper are theft, trespass, bribing or
otherwise inducing employees or others to reveal the information in
breach of duty, fraudulent misrepresentations, threats of harm by
unlawful conduct, wire tapping, procuring one’s own employees or
agents to become employees of the other for purposes of
espionage . . . .
25. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
26. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481–82 (citation omitted).
27. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015–16.
28. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“A
person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not
having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable
to the other.”), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625B (AM. LAW INST.
1977) (“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.”), with RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (providing the employee’s expectation of privacy in
physical and electronic spaces).
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device for continuous use in the operation of the business.”29 The
UTSA provides that:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.30

“The broader definition . . . extends protection to a plaintiff who
has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a
trade secret to use.”31 The UTSA makes clear that it applies to
any “information” that meets the stated qualifications.32
As in the 1939 Restatement, the UTSA is not based on a
property theory of entitlement: “The Uniform Act codifies the
basic principles of common law trade secret protection, preserving
its essential distinctions from patent law. Under both the Act and
common law principles, for example, more than one person can be
entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the same
information . . . .”33
Unlike a patent published with its claims (metes and bounds)
and ownership registered with the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, “trade secrets” are amorphous—dependent on situational
29. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(defining “trade secret”).
30. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985) (emphasis added).
31. Id. § 1 cmt.
32. Notably these do not include the fifth of the six factors listed in
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“[T]he amount
of effort or money expended by him in developing the information.”).
33. Unif. Trade Secrets Act, Prefatory Note (1985). Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) found in a “taking” analysis a “property
interest” in documents submitted to the government designated “trade secret.”
“Fee simple” ownership, however, has been rejected as a Maryland UTSA
requisite. DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir.
2001) (“[C]onceptual difficulty arises from any assumption that knowledge can
be owned as property.”). Accord Advanced Fluid Systems, Inc. v. Huber, 28 F.
Supp. 3d 306, 318–23 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (providing the same for Pennsylvania’s
UTSA).
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value and effort to keep secret—particularly UTSA “trade
secrets” that may be ideas held in the minds of several people.
The UTSA does not define an “owner,” but creates a tort remedy
for acquisition by “improper means” or unauthorized use in
breach of a confidential relationship—where entitlement of the
plaintiff is based on the liability of the tortfeasor.
The 1995 Restatement of Unfair Competition embraced the
principles of the UTSA, noting that, “[m]any cases acknowledge
that the primary issue is the propriety of the defendant’s conduct
as a means of competition” and that
[t]he definition of a trade secret contained in this Section
[consistent with the UTSA] . . . is directly applicable only to
the imposition of civil liability under the rules stated in § 40. It
does not apply, other than by analogy, in actions under
criminal statutes or in other circumstances not involving civil
liability for the appropriation of a trade secret . . . . 34

III. EEA Is Directed to “Theft” or “Conversion” of Narrower,
“Owned” Manifestations
Contrary to the 1995 Restatement’s caution, the EEA
criminal statute was enacted the following year by the 104th
Congress as a combination of H.R. 3723 and S. 1556 with a
definition of “trade secret” similar to that of UTSA § 1(4) but
shown here to be much narrower:
H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Act of l996, creates a new
crime of wrongfully copying or otherwise controlling trade
secrets, if done with the intent either to (1) benefit a foreign
government, instrumentality, or agent, or (2) disadvantage the
rightful owner of the trade secret and for the purpose of
benefitting another person. . . .35

S. 1556, addressed to “proprietary economic information,”
specifically protected employees:
The bill explicitly states that the term proprietary economic
information does not include the general knowledge, skills or
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1995) (“The concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended
to be consistent with the definition of ‘trade secret’ in § 1(4) of the [UTSA].”).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 3 (1996) (emphasis added).
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experience that a person has. A prosecution under this statute
must establish a particular piece of information that a person
has stolen or misappropriated. It is not enough to say that a
person has accumulated experience and knowledge during the
course of his or her employ. Nor can a person be prosecuted on
the basis of an assertion that he or she was exposed to
proprietary economic information while employed. . . .
....
“Proprietary economic information” is defined as a type of
intellectual property connoted by four characteristics: (1) it is
proprietary; (2) its nature is economic, business, scientific,
technical, or engineering; (3) it consists of information, data,
plans, tools, mechanisms, compounds, formulas, designs,
prototypes, processes, procedures, programs, codes, or
commercial strategies; and (4) it derives value from its
exclusivity. These features distinguish it from other forms of
intellectual property, such as literary or artistic works. [It]
also does not include general knowledge, experience, training,
or skill acquired by a person as a result of his or her
employment or hire by any owner.36

The EEA adopted a definition of “trade secrets” that did not
include the definition of “commercial strategies” that was
included in the otherwise similar S. 1556 and definition of
“proprietary economic information”:37
(3) the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering
information,
including
patterns,
plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how
stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically,
graphically, photographically, or in writing if—
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not

36. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 12–14 (1996).
37. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012), with H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 2 ,
and S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 2.
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being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public . . . .38

Despite explanations in the reports that the EEA “trade
secret” definition is based on the UTSA,39 the language is
substantively different. In a case of “more is less,” the longer list
of examples and characterizations, combined with the narrow
reading to be given terms in a criminal statute, as well as usage
within EEA to support its objective of punishing “theft” and
“conversion,” particularly with the additional express (if vague)
definition of ownership, EEA “trade secrets” are very arguably a
subclass of UTSA “trade secrets” that do not include mentally
held “knowledge, skills and experience.”
The UTSA uses open-ended “including” examples for
unrestricted “information”; EEA uses “including” examples for
express categories of information, omitting categories such as
“cultural,” “literary,” and “strategic.” The language quoted from
the Senate Report ruled out “literary or artistic” categories.
The EEA characterizes its examples as being “stored,
compiled,
or
memorialized”—not
learned,
known,
or
remembered—“physically,
electronically,
graphically,
photographically, or in writing”—not mentally as the ideas
protected by the UTSA as recognized in the 1995 Restatement.40
The base EEA §§ 1831 and 1832 offenses of “theft” and
“conversion” apply most clearly to physical objects or records,
including “electronic” (which was considered during the 1990s to
be “intangible”)—rather than mental knowledge. “Conversion”
(intent required by both sections) is wrongful control over
chattels, including documents into which “intangible rights are
merged,” such as motion picture film.41 In accordance with the
purpose of the EEA quoted above, the government is “required to

38. § 1839(3).
39. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 12.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1995). See also id. cmt. d (“The appropriation of an idea offered to another
through an oral presentation . . . can be actionable under the law of trade
secrets.”).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A(1) & 242 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1965).
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prove that the defendant has wrongfully copied or otherwise
exerted control over [that is, converted] a ‘trade secret.’”42
EEA § 1832 theft expressly refers to the “owner,” and the
EEA defines owner as “the person or entity in whom or in which
rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is
reposed.”43 The UTSA does not define ownership. EEA’s reference
to “rightful legal or equitable title” has unclear application to
trade secrets that, unlike real property, patents, copyrights or
statutory trademarks, are registered and provide notice of their
scope.44 The alternative of “license” is even less clear, as licenses
are presumed to be non-exclusive. Even exclusive licensees may
not have standing to sue under other intellectual property law.
The EEA concept of ownership fits with its concern over theft and
conversion of physical (including electronic) manifestations of
trade secrets and not with “knowledge, skills and experiences,” at
least the “general” ones excluded by the Senate Report.45
If disputed, the EEA definition of “trade secret” will be
strictly construed as a part of a criminal statute.46 Deep-pocketed
parties may argue one or more of the above in a DTSA suit—and
by winning may also limit future prosecution under the criminal
provisions of the EEA.
IV. There Is No Present Need to Have Multiple Trade Secret
Compliance Plans

42. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 7 (1996).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(4) (2012).
44. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(including notice as a factor).
45. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 12–13 (1996). The elimination of the
“commercial strategies” example is consistent with the exclusion of mental
knowledge, rather than documents and other chattel manifesting secrets. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting the EEA’s exclusion of
“commercial strategies”).
46. United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2012)
(construing the original EEA jurisdictional “produced for . . . interstate or
foreign commerce” definition strictly (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S.
207, 213 (1985))); cf. WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199,
204 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act “rule of lenity”
in civil action).
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Notwithstanding the arguably narrower applicability of EEA
“trade secrets,” it simply is not true, as DTSA proponents stated
for the 2014 predecessor bill, that the state enactments of the
UTSA “require companies to tailor costly compliance plans to
meet each individual state’s law.”47 Under the EEA, the UTSA,
and the 1939 Restatement, only one compliance plan is required:
one must do what is “reasonable” to keep the information sought
to be protected “secret.”48
The relatively few enforcement differences between
particular UTSA enactments do not affect what can and should
be done to protect information intended to be protected by the
USTA or EEA definitions of “misappropriation” or “theft.”
Variations by six states and the EEA of the UTSA § 1(4)(i)
qualification of “not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use”49 also do not
47. H.R. REP. NO. 113-657, at 7 (2014). Nor is enactment of the DTSA
necessary to establish a “single national baseline” of “minimum protection,” as
now suggested by the sponsors for its harmonization without preemption. See
161 CONG. REC. S7251 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. Coons). It
already exists.
48. The EEA requires “reasonable measures to keep such information
secret.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012). UTSA § 1(4)(ii) requires “efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain [the protected information’s]
secrecy.” Among the UTSA states, only Colorado requires “measures to prevent
the secret from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the
owner to have access thereto for limited purposes,” COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74102(4) (2015), but the same baseline of “reasonable efforts” or “reasonable
measures” would appear to meet this requirement. A New York intermediate
appellate court (one of the two non-UTSA states) has cited the 1995 Restatement
that adopted the UTSA definition with approval. E.g. Wiener v. Lazard Freres &
Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 124, 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The other
non-UTSA state, Massachusetts, has adopted the 1939 Restatement. See J.T.
Healy & Son v. James A. Murphy & Son, 260 N.E.2d 723, 738 (1970) (“But if the
person entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its exclusive use in his own
business, he must not fail to take all proper and reasonable steps to keep it
secret.”). The 1939 Restatement includes a requirement of “a substantial
element of secrecy,” measured by factors including “the extent of measures
taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
49. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (Deering 2015) (“[N]ot being generally
known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use.”); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2(d)(1) (2015) (“[N]ot being
generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-502 (2015) (“[N]ot being known to, and
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affect what can and should be done to protect secrets. Whether a
purported secret is “generally known to” or “readily ascertainable
by” an undefined “public” as in the EEA or a relevant public as
specified by the UTSA, that knowledge is outside the control of a
compliance plan.
Issues arise not from the different emphases of UTSA
variants, but from non-disclosure agreements that cast a wide net
without providing meaningful notice, unaccompanied by other
efforts to ensure security of valuable information. Often
obligations sunset for the convenience of business associates.
Instead of preventing unfair competition by targeting
unauthorized use of specific information, employers use the less
expensive, blunt instrument of prohibiting post-employment
competition altogether for a time that is related less to the “shelf
life” of the information than to the ability of most employees to
forego employment doing what they have gained experience
doing.
V. DTSA Is “Not Ready for Prime Time”
A. Any Federal Cause of Action for Unfair Competition Should Be
Better Studied Before Implementation
Congress has been circumspect about creating federal private
rights of action for unfair competition and should remain so. A
federal cause of action for unfair competition based on terms such
as the DTSA’s “improper means,” “consent,” and “duty to
maintain secrecy or to limit use,” if it succeeds in opening federal
courts to a significant number who cannot avail now (assuming
these exist), will result in more frequent and perhaps more

not being ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3)(a)
(2015) (“[N]ot being generally known or readily ascertainable through
independent development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461(4)(a)
(2015) (“[N]ot being generally known to the public or to other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-820(5)(a)(i) (2014) (“[N]ot being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other person who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use.”).
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rigorous federal litigation of these terms, rather than state court
litigation.
If it does not preempt the same UTSA terms, this likely
would lead to greater disharmony, rather than the promised
harmony. Even if not expressly preemptive, federal courts are
likely to establish new constructions of UTSA or DTSA terms and
may de facto preempt the more conservative operation of the
“laboratories of democracy”—particularly because there is no
DTSA counterpart to the UTSA § 8 deference to uniform
development by the states.
With the rapid expansion of uses for inexpensive aerial
drones, including surveillance, one expects that the Christopher
precedent for aerial reconnaissance as “improper means” will be
applied early—and perhaps often. Compared to a UTSA action,
federal DTSA action may better withstand a preemption
challenge under federal regulations that might be put in place,
for example, by the Federal Aviation Administration.50
Concurrent or separate decisions on DTSA “improper
means,” “consent,” and “duty to maintain secrecy or to limit use”
may affect the previous thirty years of federal court development
of the terms “access . . . without authorization,” “exceed[ing]
authorized access,” “agent,” and “lawful consent” in the federal
anti-hacking Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),51 the
“wiretap” title of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
(“ECPA”),52 and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).53
Common issues relating to expectations, authorized or proper

50. See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Announces Small UAS
Registration
Rule
(Dec.
14,
2015),
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=19856 (last visited Dec. 16,
2015) (announcing a web-based aircraft registration process for owners of small
unmanned aircraft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). The
Administration is currently proposing some modifications. See UPDATED
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, WHITE HOUSE (Jan.
13,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-la
w-enforcement-tools.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
52. Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521
(2012).
53. Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2709 (2012).
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access by employees to the computer systems of their employers,54
or visitors to “public” websites with restrictive online terms55
span the small separation between personal privacy and the
commercial privacy protected by the DTSA.
A difference from the current coexistence of UTSA, CFAA,
ECPA, SCA, and other state law is that while the DTSA retains
the EEA non-preemption of law, including state law, “for the
misappropriation of a trade secret,”56 there is nothing said about
preemption of other law. Thus there is a question of whether the
DTSA would preempt a breach of contract,57 breach of
confidentiality action, or the application of a contract to establish
a duty of confidentiality.
B. Does DTSA’s Promise of “Employee Mobility” Preempt NonCompete Agreements?
DTSA expressly restricts injunctions at proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 1836(b)(3)(i): “provided the order does not prevent a person from
accepting an offer of employment under conditions that avoid
actual or threatened misappropriation.”58 The sponsors put on the
legislative record that the DTSA would not “restrict employee
mobility” and “states explicitly that a person cannot be prevented
from accepting an offer of employment because of his or her prior
exposure to trade secrets.”59
54. E.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(determining that authorization was not lost by non-work use of employer
computer system).
55. E.g., Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Nothing inherent in any of these steps prompts us to infer that access by
the general public was restricted.”).
56. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong. §
2(f) (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012).
57. Cf.
Uniform
Trade
Secrets
Act,
§
7(b)(1)
(1985),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2015) (providing no effect on “contractual remedies, whether or
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
58. H.R. 3326 & S. 1890 § 2(a).
59. 161 CONG. REC. S7252 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). This appears to be a reversal of the declared neutrality of the 2014
predecessor bill on the “inevitable disclosure doctrine.” H.R. REP. NO. 113-657, at
12 n.9 (2014).
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Does this express federal policy preempt an employee noncompete agreement premised on an employee’s “prior exposure to
trade secrets,” as many such agreements need to be in order to be
enforceable?60 Reading the employee mobility proviso literally,
would it allow an injunction to be written to bar the use of
specific secrets? If so, may an employee subject to such a noncompete agreement justified by potential misappropriation of
trade secrets (or their new employers) file declaratory judgment
action to void or rewrite the agreement?
As the use of employee non-compete agreements is widespread, one would expect the employee mobility proviso to be
removed or rewritten.
VI. Conclusion
The DTSA’s federalization of UTSA “misappropriation” likely
will not alter the current mix of trade secret cases founded in
broken business deals and exiting employees, but may incentivize
through the encouragement of private litigation new claims based
on shared ideas, aerial surveillance, or web monitoring in
“violation” of terms of service. The EEA definition of “trade
secrets” adopted by the DTSA is arguably substantially narrower
than that of the UTSA and may be further established as such
through civil litigation by defendants with more resources than
most EEA criminal defendants. Most importantly, while there
has been no demonstration that differences in UTSA enactment
or enforcement require different compliance programs that may
60. Generally under the common law, most states will enforce a restrictive
covenant if it can demonstrate that the employer, “by means of a reasonably
tailored restrictive covenant,” protects the employer’s “trade secrets . . . and
other protectable confidential information.” RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 8.07(a)–(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The definition of “trade secrets” is similar
to that of UTSA § 1(3), with a requirement of “reasonable measures.” Id.
§ 8.02(b). “Confidential information” that is not “technically” a “trade secret” is
protectable where the employee “was put on notice of which information the
employer considered confidential and proprietary,” but does not include
information that would be considered part of the general experience, knowledge,
training, and skills that an employee acquires in the course of employment.” Id.
§ 8.07 cmt. b. A majority of states will rewrite (“blue pencil”) the contract. Id.
§ 8.08, Reporters’ Notes for cmt. a. But clearly there is difference among the
states, notably California, which voids restraints on employment. CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2015).
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be resolved by DTSA harmonization, the DTSA does not in fact
harmonize. Instead, the DTSA creates dual private unfair
competition litigation regimes with different definitions of “trade
secrets” and limited preemption that likely will affect the scope of
EEA “trade secrets,” employment law, and possibly online
privacy. Thus, it would be prudent for Congress to act
conservatively and rethink the DTSA.

